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Berkshire versus KKR: 
 
Intermediary Influence and Competition 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham† 
INTRODUCTION 
The American financial services industry employs 
innumerable intermediaries working for investors and savers, 
such as accountants, advisors, agents, bankers, brokers, 
consultants, directors, funds, lawyers, managers, and rating 
agencies. They charge considerable fees to facilitate exchanges by 
easing search and synthesizing or validating complex 
information. Their influence has been studied from numerous 
perspectives, including behavioral finance,1 industrial 
economics,2 and public-choice theory.3 Such treatments 
illuminate why financial intermediaries exist, what value they 
add, and what costs they impose, from the perspective of how 
clients act, how market structures work, and how laws and 
policies are formulated. 
To this substantial literature comes a welcome supplement—
Intermediary Influence—thanks to Professor Kathryn Judge. 
Providing a singular account of intermediary influence as a 
source of sustained pricing power, Judge’s article warns of 
excessive transaction costs, a net direct loss to the constituents of 
intermediaries (on both sides), and an indirect net social loss.5 
 
 † Henry St. George Tucker III Research Professor, George Washington University 
Law School. 
 1 See generally, for example, Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency 
Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Corporate 
Governance Rights, 113 Colum L Rev 863 (2013). 
 2 See generally, for example, Rosemary L. Batt and Eileen Appelbaum, The Impact 
of Financialization on Management and Employment Outcomes (Upjohn Institute, Feb 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/ACG5-QL56. 
 3 See generally, for example, John C. Coffee Jr, The Political Economy of Dodd-
Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 
Cornell L Rev 1019 (2012). 
 5 Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence,  
82 U Chi L Rev 573, 624-630  (2015). 
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Such an outcome is in tension with prevailing thought in 
microeconomics, which prescribes and predicts that market forces 
spontaneously and inexorably pressure for transaction cost 
minimization.6 
After all, as Professor Ronald Coase taught nearly a century 
ago, rational economic actors will self-rely when the costs of 
intermediation exceed the gains. This is the rationale for the 
existence of firms: they organize economic activity.7 
Economists dating to the writing of Coase’s seminal work, 
The Nature of the Firm, assume that institutional arrangements 
evolve to minimize transaction costs, yet Judge highlights how 
the influence of financial intermediaries often produces 
persistently high transaction costs. Her intuition is that 
contemporary transaction costs are heavy with fees charged by 
intermediaries who seek to maximize economic gain in settings in 
which their expertise and positions enable them to promote 
institutional arrangements that yield high fees despite the 
existence of lower-cost alternatives.8  
Judge uses examples from several contexts—those of real 
estate agents,9 stockbrokers,10 mutual funds,11 and stock 
exchanges12—to illustrate how intermediary influence is 
accumulated and wielded. While acknowledging that financial 
intermediaries often add value and earn fees commensurate with 
benefits, Judge simultaneously explains how the phenomenon of 
intermediary influence should be incorporated into theories of 
economic behavior and explores how market participants and 
policymakers might respond in high-fee environments.13 Among 
the various important responses are competitive or regulatory 
 
 6 See Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer, The Enduring Power of Coase, 54 
J L & Econ S63, S64 (2011) (stating that “almost every field of economics and political 
science is shaped by Coasean [transaction cost theory] insights”). See also generally Jason 
Scott Johnston, The Influence of The Nature of the Firm on the Theory of Corporate Law, 
18 J Corp L 213 (1993) (examining the widespread influence and adoption of Coase’s 
transaction cost theory in the field of corporate law). But see Anoop Madhok, Reassessing 
the Fundamentals and Beyond: Ronald Coase, the Transaction Cost and Resource-Based 
Theories of the Firm and the Institutional Structure of Production, 23 Strategic Mgmt J 
535, 535–36 (2002) (analyzing a resource-based theory of firm activity in tension with 
Coase’s transaction cost–minimization theory). 
 7 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 390–98 (1937).  
 8 Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U Chi L Rev 589–90 (2015). 
 9 See id at 583–88. 
 10 See id at 600–01. 
 11 See id at 602–10. 
 12 See Judge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 598–600 (cited in note 8). 
 13 See id at 635–42. 
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tools that increase transparency, enabling participants to shop 
comparatively in order to avoid excessive fees.14 
In this Essay, I offer an additional context—the acquisitions 
market—in which intermediary influence manifests itself yet is 
accompanied by potential competitive and regulatory pressures of 
the kind Judge envisions constraining excessive fees. In this 
market, acquirers are diverse, and they include financial bidders 
such as private equity firms as well as strategic buyers like rivals 
in similar sectors and diversifying conglomerates. These 
acquirers’ propensities to use intermediaries and generate costs 
vary: many incur significant and frequent fees, while others 
eschew them. Sellers of businesses—and others affected by the 
acquisition process, including shareholders, lenders, employees, 
and other stakeholders—face radically different cost structures. 
The acquisition industry is characterized by the traits that, 
as Judge shows, typify intermediary influence: transaction 
constituents are often one-time players who rely heavily on 
acquisition intermediaries.15 These intermediaries are in turn 
repeat players in oligopolistic markets who engineer complex, 
opaque transactions that require specialized knowledge.16 But the 
industry is not limited to intermediaries wielding influence and 
earning high fees; it also includes rivals who keep costs low. This 
Essay highlights two powerhouses representing opposite ends of 
the spectrum of financial intermediation: Berkshire Hathaway, 
the conglomerate built by Warren Buffett that eschews financial 
intermediation, and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR), the 
pioneering private equity firm that thrives on such 
intermediation. The juxtaposition illustrates both the 
intermediary influence that Judge describes and the efficacy of 
her prescription to counter it with transparent low-cost rivals. 
After presenting this comparison and drawing related 
implications, this Essay offers broader reflections on Judge’s 
work, principally by posing four questions: How much should we 
expect financial intermediaries’ fees to decline due to 
technological advances in light of countervailing factors such as 
globalization and complexity that may sustain high fees? Is it 
feasible to distinguish the influence on institutional 
arrangements of specific intermediaries from the influence and 
effects of other participants? Is intermediary influence invariably 
exerted to benefit primarily intermediaries or instead to aid 
 
 14 See id at 638. 
 15 See id at 614–16. 
 16 See Judge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 618–20 (cited in note 8). 
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producers or even consumers? And can the causal arrow be 
discerned—that is, is it clear that certain institutional 
arrangements exist because of intermediary influence, or might 
institutional arrangements such as oligopolistic industry 
structures cause the influence? This Essay stresses that, far from 
constituting criticism of Judge’s work, such questions warrant 
further research precisely because her work is so important and 
fruitful. 
I.  THE PROMISE OF LOW-COST RIVALS 
A Wall Street saying quips that while transactions generate 
fees, fees often generate transactions. An acute example occurs 
when a company is encouraged to make an acquisition to diversify 
and gain synergies, only to be later encouraged to divest the 
business to unify focus and to shed the shackles of bureaucracy. 
In the world of private equity epitomized by KKR, it is common to 
see the same company  bought and sold multiple times over a 
decade or so, generating considerable repeat fees for the 
intermediaries who design and administer such transactions.17  
While conglomerates sometimes follow the buy-and-flip 
approach, strategic buyers (and Berkshire, to a fault) generally 
prefer a buy-and-hold route with fewer intermediaries and lower 
costs.18. As competitors in the acquisition market, it should be 
possible for Berkshire and other strategic buyers to dampen the 
fees of KKR and other private equity firms, at least if there are 
enough participants and if fees are disclosed for scrutiny. Neither 
condition currently prevails, but policy might be nudged in those 
directions. 
A. Anti-intermediation: Berkshire Hathaway19 
Berkshire—a fifty-year-old conglomerate under Buffett’s 
leadership and now America’s third-largest public company—
 
 17 See Steven N. Kaplan and Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 
23 J Econ Persp 121, 129 (2009) (finding that “secondary buyouts”—sales from one private 
equity firm to another—are the second most common investment exit method). 
 18 See George P. Baker and George David Smith, The New Financial Capitalists: 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and the Creation of Corporate Value 168 (Cambridge 1998) (“The 
documented behavior of successful conglomerates shows that they tended to be 
opportunistic buyers but reluctant sellers of companies. So long as constituent business 
units continued to meet minimal corporate performance criteria, they were unlikely to be 
sold.”). 
 19 For additional analysis of Berkshire, see generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
Berkshire’s Disintermediation: Buffett’s New Managerial Model, 50 Wake Forest L Rev 
(forthcoming 2015) (examining Berkshire’s anti-intermediation policies and suggesting 
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almost never uses intermediaries. Despite being held by 
approximately one million shareholders and boasting a market 
capitalization nearing half a trillion dollars,20 it has scarcely 
borrowed money;21 despite being built through the serial 
acquisition of some seventy subsidiaries over fifty years, 
Berkshire has rarely hired a business broker;23 and despite 
employing nearly 350,000 people,24 it hardly ever uses consultants 
of any kind.25 As Berkshire’s vice chairman, Charlie Munger, once 
explained to me, the company follows these practices because it 
takes Professor Coase seriously. Why others don’t is likely due to 
a combination of factors, including managerial interests (agency 
costs), the allure of debt, and legal pressures to reduce liability 
risk—and also due to intermediary influence. 
While American companies borrow heavily to boost returns 
and gain tax advantages,26 Berkshire shuns debt as costly and 
constraining, preferring to rely on itself and use its own money.27 
It generates abundant earnings and retains 100 percent of 
them—it has not paid a dividend in nearly fifty years.28 In 2014, 
Berkshire’s net worth grew by $18.3 billion—all of which was 
available for reinvestment.29 Its time horizon is forever because it 
commits to own its subsidiaries indefinitely—a promise backed 
 
that these policies may shape future generations of similar firms); Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Berkshire beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value of Values (Columbia 2014) 
(examining how Berkshire’s distinctive corporate culture informs its success). See also 
generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Minus the Middleman: Berkshire Model Offers 
Profitable Lessons (Omaha World-Herald, May 2, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/R7WS-GKEE; Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Philosophy of Warren E. 
Buffett (NY Times, May 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H7BP-Q285. 
 20 See Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Cl A (MarketWatch, Sept 11, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5VSA-KXT6. 
 21 See Cunningham, 50 Wake Forest L Rev at *9–10 (cited in note 19). 
 23 Cunningham, Berkshire beyond Buffett at 213 (cited in note 19). 
 24 Berkshire 2014 Report at *125 (cited in note 22). 
 25 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Buffett’s and Berkshire’s Anti-bureaucracy (Columbia 
Law School, June 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/636E-X8GL. 
 26 See generally John R. Graham, How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?, 55 J Fin 
1901 (2000). But see generally Jennifer Blouin, John E. Core, and Wayne Guay, Have the 
Tax Benefits of Debt Been Overestimated?, 98 J Fin Econ 195 (2010). 
 27 See Berkshire 2014 Report at *118 (cited in note 22) (“We use debt sparingly and, 
when we do borrow, we attempt to structure our loans on a long-term fixed-rate basis. We 
will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet.”). But 
see id at *113 (“We also issue debt in the ordinary course of business to fund business 
operations, business acquisitions and for other general purposes.”). 
 28 See Cunningham, 50 Wake Forest L Rev at *7 (cited in note 19). See also Berkshire 
2014 Report at *124 (cited in note 22). 
 29 Berkshire 2014 Report at *3 (cited in note 22). 
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by a record of not selling one in forth years.30 Thanks to its long 
time horizon, Berkshire’s deferred taxes total over $60 billion.31 
These amount to interest-free government loans without 
covenants.  
The principal leverage at Berkshire is insurance float.32 This 
refers to funds that arise because Berkshire receives premiums 
up front but need not pay claims until later, if it all.33 Provided 
that insurance is underwritten with discipline, float is akin to 
borrowed money but cheaper, and it comes without due dates or 
covenants.34 At Berkshire, float now totals $84 billion, which is 
used to buy businesses that continue to multiply Berkshire’s 
value.35 
All these sources of funds can be transferred among 
Berkshire subsidiaries, so those with excess cash support those 
with capital needs—all tax free and without the frictional costs of 
debt.36 Berkshire and its subsidiaries become self-reliant, self-
disciplining financing machines. (Two of Berkshire’s capital-
intensive subsidiaries, a railroad and a public utility, borrow 
significant sums, but none of their debt is guaranteed by 
Berkshire.37) 
American corporations rely heavily on intermediaries, such 
as business brokers and investment bankers, who charge fees and 
have incentives to get deals done; firms also use accountants, 
consultants, and lawyers to conduct due diligence before closing. 
Berkshire rarely uses bankers or brokers, and it does limited due 
 
 30 Cunningham, The Philosophy of Warren E. Buffet (cited in note 19) (“Unique 
among its rivals in the acquisition market, Berkshire has not sold a subsidiary in 40 years, 
and pledges not to do so unless a business is doomed.”); Berkshire 2014 Report at *119 
(cited in note 22): 
Regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that 
Berkshire owns. We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as 
we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about 
their managers and labor relations. 
 31 Berkshire 2014 Report at *72 (cited in note 22). 
 32 Andrea Frazzini, David Kabiller, and Lasse H. Pedersen, Buffett’s Alpha *11–12 
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Nov 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/82JU-
DHF8 (identifying Berkshire Hathaway’s “two main liabilities [as] debt and insurance 
float . . . [with] 36% of Berkshire’s liabilities consist[ing] of insurance float on average.”). 
 33 See id at *12. 
 34 Berkshire 2014 Report at *119 (cited in note 22). 
 35 Id at *8. 
 36 See Cunningham, 50 Wake Forest L Rev at *10–11 (cited in note 19). 
 37 See Cunningham, 50 Wake Forest L Rev at *10 n 38 (cited in note 19) (identifying 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe and Berkshire Hathaway Energy together as accounting 
for $55 billion of Berkshire’s $74 billion total debt); Berkshire 2014 Report at *12 (cited in 
note 22). 
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diligence.38 Instead, Berkshire relies on a network of 
relationships, including previous sellers of businesses.39 Buffett is 
self-reliant, thanks to gargantuan reading that gives him broad 
business knowledge and an investment philosophy that values 
companies based on old-fashioned business analysis rather than 
market-based proxies such as price-earnings multiples.40 
Most acquirers of businesses promptly implement 
operational changes and related engineering to integrate a 
business, find synergies, and cut costs. Berkshire acquires only 
companies for which no such changes are needed, and it never 
pursues such a strategy.41 
Indeed, contrary to the practice at most sizable American 
corporations, Berkshire has no centralized procedures or 
departments, no hierarchies for reporting or budgeting, and no 
middle managers.42 All such functions are handled in the 
individual units. In fact, Berkshire headquarters employs just 
twenty-five people.43 And Berkshire gives CEOs of its subsidiaries 
almost unbridled discretion over operations.44 Once a year, 
Buffett sends them the same one-page letter with six broad 
mandates on it, such as “protect Berkshire’s reputation” and 
“report bad news early.”45 “Many speak to Buffett only once a 
year—others less often.”46  
 
 38 See Lawrence Cunningham, Cunningham: Why Don’t More Companies Copy the 
Berkshire Model? (Omaha World-Herald, May 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/RJ69-
3V5Q; Cunningham, 50 Wake Forest L Rev at *12–13 (cited in note 19) (providing 
examples of Berkshire’s limited use of intermediaries in its acquisitions). 
 39 See Robert E. Miles, The Warren Buffett CEO: Secrets from the Berkshire 
Hathaway Managers 344 (Wiley 2002). 
 40 See id at 342. 
 41 See Berkshire 2014 Report at *40 (cited in note 22) (describing the Berkshire 
acquisition policy as “seek[ing] to pay a fair price for a good business that the Chairman 
could pretty well understand”). The rare exceptions occurred early in Buffett’s career, such 
as the 1977 acquisition of The Buffalo News, which faced considerable competitive 
pressure. See Miles, The Warren Buffett CEO at 235 (cited in note 39). 
 42 See Berkshire 2014 Report at *86 (cited in note 22). 
 43 Id at *6, 125. 
 44 See Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: 2009 Annual Report *5 (2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9FVJ-8KW8 (“We tend to let our many subsidiaries operate on their own, 
without our supervising and monitoring them to any degree.”). 
 45 Cunningham, 50 Wake Forest L Rev at *9 (cited in note 19). 
 46 Cunningham, Buffett’s and Berkshire’s Anti-bureaucracy (cited in note 25). See 
also Miles, The Warren Buffett CEO at vi (cited in note 25) (“Warren’s CEOs do not have 
to call Omaha daily or provide weekly reports. . . . Of course, most of them want to talk to 
Buffett and check in periodically. But they don’t have to.”). 
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Today, corporate America’s boards are intermediaries 
between shareholders and management.47 Directors are monitors 
involved in specific strategic decision making.48 They meet 
monthly, using many committees,49 which in turn hire 
accountants, consultants, and lawyers. American directors are 
well paid, averaging salaries of $263,748 annually—including 
considerable stock compensation and company-purchased 
liability insurance.50 Berkshire’s board, in contrast, follows the 
old-fashioned advisory model: It is comprised of friends and 
family, who are directors because they are interested in 
Berkshire.51 They do not oversee management, but rather provide 
support and advice. There are few committees, no hired advisors, 
and only two or three meetings per year.52 Berkshire pays its 
directors essentially nothing and provides no insurance.53 But 
Berkshire’s directors are significant shareholders, each of whom 
bought the stock with their own cash.54 
As Judge notes, most American corporate equity is owned by 
large financial intermediaries such as mutual funds, hedge funds, 
and pension funds.55 Stock trading is frequent and portfolios are 
regularly rebalanced to maintain diversification. As Judge 
observes, this generates significant fees for intermediaries as well 
as frictional costs for investors.56 Most of Berkshire’s shareholders 
either own the stock directly—individuals, families, and family 
offices—or hold it through family-oriented firms that concentrate 
in Berkshire stock.57 Berkshire’s share turnover is low and is 
 
 47 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 
1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan L Rev 1465, 1468 
(2007).  
 48 See id at 1506. 
 49 See id at 1490–94. 
 50 See 2014 Spencer Stuart Board Index *35 (Spencer Stuart 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8L5J-4PSZ. 
 51 See Andrew Kilpatrick, Of Permanent Value: The Story of Warren Buffett 164 
(McGraw-Hill rev ed 1998) (“Berkshire’s board is small, family-oriented and has no real 
outside directors.”). 
 52 See id at 163 (“In keeping with its lean structure carefully devised by Buffett, there 
are only seven directors on the board, which has no standing committees and gets little in 
the way of outside advice.”). 
 53 See Berkshire 2014 Report at *36 (cited in note 22) (describing Berkshire’s 
directors’ fees as “token” and claiming that Berkshire carries “no directors and officers 
liability insurance”). 
 54 See id. 
 55 Judge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 602 (cited in note 8) (noting that institutional investors 
owned more than “76 percent of the outstanding equity for 1,000 largest corporations”). 
 56 Id at 605–06. 
 57 See Cunningham, 50 Wake Forest L Rev at *6 (cited in note 19). 
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many shareholders’ largest holding.58 All this minimizes the role 
and costs of intermediaries, from stockbrokers to exchanges. 
Corporations are hierarchies, with shareholders owning a 
residual claim on firm assets in the form of an equity stake after 
liabilities are covered by assets. That inherent separation of 
ownership from control provides a fertile environment for 
financial intermediaries to flourish.59 In contrast, Buffett defines 
Berkshire as a partnership, declaring from the outset: “Although 
our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.”60 This is a 
legacy from Buffett’s start: he was running a partnership that, in 
1965, acquired Berkshire, which then began acquiring other 
companies en route to becoming the galactic corporation it is 
today.61 Buffett retained that partnership spirit, a profound 
disintermediation that views the corporation as a conduit through 
which shareholders own its assets and not merely an equity 
stake.62 Such conceptions are the polar opposite to the chain of 
intermediation in many contemporary financial sectors that 
Judge criticizes.63  
Most corporate boards set their dividend policies to follow a 
regular periodic amount invariant to business conditions and 
split the stock when price exceeds an affordable trading range in 
order to keep shareholders interested in trading it.64 Berkshire’s 
dividend policy varies with corporate ability to reinvest earnings 
profitably, which has meant no dividends since 1969; it has polled 
shareholders on whether they approve of this policy (they do).65 It 
doesn’t split the stock to keep the price low. On the contrary, 
consider a spectacular example of Berkshire’s anti-
intermediation policy: In 1996, when Berkshire’s stock traded at 
$34,900, two money managers designed a unit trust that would 
buy the stock and issue fractional units designed to trade at a low 
price. They would charge fees for this service that would draw 
new traders to Berkshire, increasing transaction costs. To knock 
out these middlemen, Berkshire amended its charter to rename 
its existing common stock as Class A and add a Class B with 
 
 58 See Cunningham, Berkshire beyond Buffett at 37 (cited in note 19). 
 59 See Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from 
Control, 33 Seattle U L Rev 877, 879–884 (2010).  
 60 Berkshire 2014 Report at *36 (cited in note 22). 
 61 See id at *24–28. 
 62 See id at *117. 
 63 See Judge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 624–30 (cited in note 8). 
 64 See Cunningham, 50 Wake Forest L Rev at *7 (cited in note 19). 
 65 See Berkshire 2014 Report at *38 (cited in note 22) (describing a tally of proxy 
votes in which 98 percent of the shares represented voted to keep the no-dividend policy). 
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fractional rights.66 It vowed to offer as many shares as necessary 
to fill orders—which it did, killing demand for the unit trust.67 
Berkshire’s savings from omitting the middleman include the 
direct costs of fees and interest plus the vastly larger indirect 
costs of relying on advisors whose incentives are to encourage 
more action—more debt, deals, trading, services, and fees. While 
Buffett and Munger are responsible for much of this practice, it 
has been internalized across the institution and is likely to endure 
after successors assume control.68 The more interesting question 
is not whether such habits can endure at Berkshire but rather 
why they are not more widely practiced. Judge is right to explain 
that intermediary influence is a factor—consequently, public 
policy should be designed to encourage proliferation of the 
Berkshire model. 
B. Pro-intermediation: Kohlberg Kravis Roberts 
KKR—a forty-year-old leveraged buyout firm and the 
historical driving force behind today’s massive private equity 
industry—is both an intermediary and a progenitor of 
intermediaries.69 Its business model and philosophy are at the 
other end of the spectrum from that of Berkshire in nearly every 
important way. Having arranged for the purchase and sale of 
thousands of companies, it has structured mountains of debt, 
generated enormous fees from merger advisory services in 
thousands of transactions, and reaped additional gains from 
innumerable advisory and consulting services.70 
KKR’s business model involves creating a series of separate 
funds that buy, run, and sell a discrete number of individual 
companies, relying throughout on massive borrowing.71 A typical 
fund deal is financed with at least 70 percent debt.72 Moreover, 
virtually all equity—all but 1 to 5 percent—is staked not by the 
firm but by outside investors and solicited in private placements 
facilitated by intermediaries, including pension plans, university 
endowments, sovereign wealth funds, banks, and insurance 
 
 66 Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections on the Pricing of Shares, 19 Cardozo L Rev 493, 
500–01 (1997). 
 67 See id at 503.  
 68 Cunningham, Minus the Middleman (cited in note 19). 
 69 See Eileen Appelbaum and Rosemary Batt, Private Equity at Work: When Wall 
Street Manages Main Street 21–24 (Russell Sage Foundation 2014). 
 70 See id at 24–27. 
 71 Baker and Smith, The New Financial Capitalists at 168–69 (cited in note 18). 
 72 Appelbaum and Batt, Private Equity at Work at 2 (cited in note 69).  
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companies.73 In form, funds are dubbed “partnerships,” with KKR 
as the general partner and each such equity investor a limited 
partner; but the attitude is hierarchical, with the general partner 
calling all the shots in a setting rife with conflicts of interest.74  
As general partner, KKR is less an investor than a multiline 
intermediary. As an intermediary, KKR collects 2 percent of 
investors’ equity through a “management fee,” plus 20 percent of 
the return on investment above a hurdle rate (typically 8 percent), 
which is dubbed “carried interest.”75 In addition, the intermediary 
can levy extensive fees for a wide variety of activities that it might 
engineer, such as board service on acquired companies, strategic 
consulting, executive search, merger advice, or arrangement of 
debt financing.76 Intermediary influence in such settings is 
enormous and essentially uncheckable, with the press being 
among the few bulwarks against excess.77 
KKR’s time horizon for deals is short- or medium-term, not 
long-term—and never indefinite. Rather, purchases and 
subsequent steps are all conducted with a focus on exiting by 
maximizing profits and minimizing duration.78 Purchases are not 
made without an exit strategy—ideally a premium-priced public 
offering orchestrated by the intermediary or an arranged sale to 
a strategic buyer or another financial buyer.79 As with most other 
 
 73 See Matthew D. Kain, Stephen B. McKeon, and Steven Davidoff Solomon, 
Intermediation in Private Equity: The Role of Placement Agents *15, 35 (unpublished 
manuscript, May 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6S9E-TZKQ (analyzing the common 
categories of external investors); Ryan Kantor and Ryan Sullivan, A Lawyers Guide: 
Valuation Issues in Private Equity Funds *2 (unpublished manuscript, Dec 6 2012), 
archived at http://perma.cc/9SB3-L9UB (placing the amount of investment capital 
provided by private equity managers between 1 and 5 percent).  
 74 See Kantor and Sullivan, A Lawyers Guide at *2–4 (cited in note 73) (noting that 
“[i]nvestors don’t participate at all in the management of the fund,” and that “[t]here are 
certain inherent and potential conflicts of interest between the funds sponsor on one hand 
and the fund and investors on the other”).  
 75 See David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 
Va L Rev 715, 722–23 (2008). 
 76 See Andrew Metrick and Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds, 
23 Rev Fin Stud 2303, 2314 (2010). 
 77 See, for example, Gretchen Morgenson, The Deal’s Done. But Not the Fees (NY 
Times, May 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/E3WM-DZSW (highlighting the high 
fees obtained by private equity firms, some of which have been described as “undetectable 
by even the most sophisticated investor,” and serving as an example of the press’s ability 
to shed light on these types of arrangements). 
 78 See Guy Fraser-Sampson, Private Equity as an Asset Class 9–11 (Wiley 2007) 
(discussing the limited nature of a private equity fund’s investments due to the limited 
partnership structure that they take). 
 79 See Kaplan and Strömberg, 23 J Econ Persp at 129 (cited in note 17) (showing 
public offerings and sales to strategic buyers or other financial buyers as the most common 
exits). 
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activities that KKR conducts on behalf of the funds and 
companies it buys, the firm charges fees for making such 
arrangements.80 When buying and selling, KKR and other private 
equity firms favor formal valuation models, such as earnings 
multiples, rather than traditional business analysis of the kind 
that Berkshire and other long-term investors apply.81 
Operational change is usually part of every takeover plan. 
While KKR and other leveraged buyout operators may look for 
incumbent managers to remain in place, weak management is 
often blamed for a target’s struggles, and the takeover includes 
reshuffling or replacing the management.82 In every case, 
intervention is deep, as the intermediary provides close direction 
to managers to execute the plan and conducts careful monitoring 
to ensure execution.83 Cost reductions are often part of the plan, 
meaning that the intermediary directs not only management 
changes but also plant closings, layoffs, research and 
development cuts, product terminations, pension reductions, and 
other radical business surgeries with clear-cut short-term gains.84 
The long-term prudence of such steps is generally not 
considered.85 
 Financial engineering is at the heart of many KKR deals, all 
involving substantial and costly intermediation.86 Often 
pejoratively dubbed “asset stripping,” standard examples are 
 
 80 See id at 124. 
 81 Fraser-Sampson, Private Equity as an Asset Class at 192–93 (cited in note Error! 
Bookmark not defined.) (describing how buyout firms perform “full financial due 
diligence . . . includ[ing] commissioning a report from an investigating accountant”). 
 82 See Kaplan and Strömberg, 23 J Econ Persp at 131–32 (cited in note 17) (“[P]rivate 
equity investors do not hesitate to replace poorly performing management. . . . [O]ne-third 
of chief executive officers of these firms are replaced in the first 100 days while two-thirds 
are replaced at some point over a four-year period.”). 
 83 See id at 131 (“[P]rivate equity investors control the boards of their portfolio 
companies and are more actively involved in governance than public company boards.”). 
 84 See id at 132: 
Private-equity firms use their industry and operating knowledge to identify 
attractive investments, to develop value creation plans for those investments, 
and to implement the value creation plans. A plan might include elements of 
cost-cutting opportunities and productivity improvements, strategic changes or 
repositioning, acquisition opportunities, as well as management changes and 
upgrades. 
 85 See Kaplan and Strömberg, 23 J Econ Persp at 133 (cited in note 17) (discussing 
the possibility that the changes implemented by the buyers prioritize short-term over long-
term returns). 
 86 See Baker and Smith, The New Financial Capitalists at 169 (cited in note 18). 
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sale-leaseback arrangements87 and dividend recapitalizations.88 
These transactions are designed and implemented by numerous 
intermediaries operating between the company and investors—
intermediaries such as the general partner, leasing agents, 
lessees, and all their agents (including accountants, bankers, and 
lawyers).89 Each receives compensation for services, the most 
substantial of which goes to the chief intermediary: the general 
partner.90 In the process, moreover, costs are borne by other 
constituents of the portfolio companies—including employees, 
suppliers, customers, communities, and creditors, who are 
unrepresented by intermediaries.91 
Since KKR is more an intermediary than an investor, it is 
inclined toward greater risk taking than an investor would 
tolerate. High leverage is appealing because the rewards from 
boosting returns on equity can be considerable, while excessive 
debt that leads to bankruptcy inflicts little pain.92 Whether a 
company prospers or fails, KKR earns fees for itself and generates 
fees and interest for other intermediaries, including financial 
institutions that participate in the process of designing and 
marketing costly debt.93 KKR’s intermediary influence is 
considerable. For example, along with other industry titans, it 
effected important vocabulary changes commonly used to describe 
the industry and its principal fuel: the pejorative label “junk 
bonds” has been successfully replaced with the congenial term 
“high-yield bonds,”94 and the term “leveraged buyout operator” 
has been changed to “private equity fund.”95 More measurably, 
 
 87 See Appelbaum and Batt, Private Equity at Work at 71–72 (cited in note 69) 
(describing sale-leaseback arrangements as “sell[ing] the property [of the] company, 
return[ing] the proceeds to the PE investors, and then requir[ing] the portfolio company 
to lease back and pay rent on the property it used to own”).  
 88 Id at 68–71, 286–87. 
 89 See, for example, id at 74–76 (describing the fallout from the private equity 
takeover of Hertz, including multiple stock offerings that were handled by intermediaries). 
 90 Id at 90 (“The ‘hierarchy of claims’ on the rewards from investing in portfolio 
companies guarantees that the general partners of [private equity] funds will capture a 
disproportionate share of the value extracted from these companies.”). 
 91 Appelbaum and Batt, Private Equity at Work at 282 (cited in note 69) (“While 
workers, vendors, creditors, and companies lost jobs, income, or solvency [in the private 
equity firm’s intervention in several businesses], the PE owners walked away virtually 
unscathed.”). 
 92 See Batt and Appelbaum, The Impact of Financialization at *27 (cited in note 2). 
 93 See id at *24. 
 94 Josh Kosman, The Buyout of America: How Private Equity Is Destroying Jobs and 
Killing the American Economy 29 (Penguin 2009). 
 95 See William Alden, Rethinking the Term “Private Equity” (NY Times, Jan 31, 
2013). The industry appears to be reconsidering the “private equity” label due to uncertain 
connotations. See id. 
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federal law treats the carried interest that KKR earns as capital 
gain taxed at 20 percent rather than ordinary income taxed at as 
much as twice that rate.96 Moreover, these intermediaries elude 
regulatory oversight, despite considerable efforts to increase 
transparency and control.97 
Berkshire, in turn, pushes back on intermediaries, including 
rivals like KKR. Buffett, who has written vigorous indictments of 
the excessive fees of financial intermediaries,98 has publicly and 
formally objected to specific KKR fees. In 1996, when Buffett 
served on the board of The Gillette Company—of which Berkshire 
and its affiliates owned 11 percent—Gillette agreed to acquire 
KKR’s share of Duracell International for $7.82 billion in stock.99 
KKR’s bill was double that of Gillette’s advisors100 (though in line 
with market pricing),101 and Buffett strongly objected to the size 
of the bill.102 Although outvoted by the rest of the board, Buffett 
went on record as opposing intermediary pricing power.103 
Berkshire’s record is unmistakable. 
Despite many differences, Berkshire and KKR are both 
buyers of businesses and therefore rivals. What they offer to 
sellers of businesses, however, differs greatly. Berkshire stakes 
all the capital necessary to offer a permanent autonomous home 
in a distinctive corporate culture free of short-term pressures.104 
KKR stakes little funding—borrowing most and bringing in 
limited partners—and offers an operational and financial plan to 
deliver rapid and sizable fees to itself along with debt discharge 
 
 96 See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private 
Equity Funds, 83 NYU L Rev 1, 14 (2008) (describing how KKR qualifies for this lower tax 
rate). See also Rande Spiegelman, Taxes: What’s New for 2015? (Schwab, Jan 14, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/ZE4Z-CCX9 (citing the maximum capital gains and income tax 
rates for 2015 at 20 and 39.6 percent, respectively).  
 97 See generally Gretchen Morgenson, Private Equity’s Free Pass (NY Times, July 
27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/C9RU-HD2N; Coffee, The Political Economy of 
Dodd-Frank, 97 Cornell L Rev 1019 (cited in note 3). 
 98 See Warren E. Buffett and Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren 
Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America 171–74 (Carolina Academic 3d ed 2013). Munger 
has bitingly criticized leverage buyouts and junk bonds. See id at 133–-34, 208–-11. 
 99 See Buffett Unable to Shave Fees in Duracell Deal (LA Times, Nov 27, 1996), 
archived at http://perma.cc/P2D4-ZKBZ; Kenneth N. Gilpin, Gillette to Buy Duracell for 
$7 Billion (NY Times, Sept 13, 1996), archived at http://perma.cc/LTW5-FJ7N.  
 100 See Kilpatrick, Of Permanent Value at 436 (cited in note 51) (“Of the fees, $10 
million went to [Gillette advisor] Morgan Stanley and Co. and $20 million to Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts and Co., the buyout firm which owned 34% of Duracell.”). 
 101  
 102 See Buffett Unable to Shave Fees in Duracell Deal (cited in note 99). 
 103 Id. 
 104 See Baker and Smith, The New Financial Capitalists at 168 (cited in note 18). 
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and returns to outside investors.105 Outcomes vary—not all 
Berkshire companies prosper (although no companies are sold) 
and KKR has both triumphs and failures (although all companies 
are sold).106 In the popular imagination and among many in the 
media, the Berkshire model has been preferred over the KKR 
way—to the consternation of the latter’s devotees.107 
Besides commanding their own fees and returns, KKR and 
its industry stress returns to shareholders above all else in 
corporate life—including employees, retirees, suppliers, and 
customers.108 While the Berkshire model is also “investor first”—
embracing an owner orientation—the long-term focus enables 
aligning shareholder returns with those of other constituents. 
Suppose labor costs are high: if the end game is two years, all cuts 
must be made in two years, necessitating layoffs and wage 
freezes; but if the horizon is indefinite, cuts can be made 
gradually over a decade, which might be done with attrition and 
lower raises. Nor is the Berkshire approach altruistic; rather, it 
is congruent with generating high and sustained returns on 
capital for shareholders. The Berkshire model aspires to be win-
win. 
There are downsides to the Berkshire model.109 The self-
reliance in acquisitions runs the risk of error given the absence of 
significant cross-checks.110 The autonomy reposed in subsidiary 
managers sometimes proves misplaced absent vetting or 
oversight.111 The decentralized structure can produce impositions 
on customers or employees at the hands of other employees or 
 
 105 See id. 
 106  Ironically, Berkshire staked funds in one of the largest and worst KKR deals ever, 
involving TXU Energy, an electric utility, for $44.37 billion in 2007. The deal soon 
collapsed, causing Berkshire an after-tax loss of nearly $1 billion. See Peter Lattman, A 
Record Buyout Turns Sour for Investors (NY Times, Feb 28, 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z8JW-3QAQ. 
 107 See, for example, Baker and Smith, The New Financial Capitalists at 28–29 (cited 
in note 18).  
 108 See George Anders, Merchants of Debt: KKR and the Mortgaging of American 
Business 157–58 (Basic Books 1992) (quoting from private KKR memoranda in 1978 and 
1987). 
 109 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire’s Blemishes: The Visible Costs 
and Upshot of Buffett’s Unique Managerial Model, Columbia Business L Rev (forthcoming 
March 2016).  
 110 See id at *6–9. 
 111 See id at *9–12. See also Edward Greene and Olivia Schmid, Duty-Free Insider 
Trading?, 2013 Colum Bus L Rev 369, 402 (2013) (describing an investigation against 
David Sokol, a Berkshire senior executive, for insider trading, in which charges were 
eventually dropped). 
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distributors, or of other corporate constituents.112 Likewise, KKR 
acquisitions can yield win-win outcomes in which managers, 
investors, employees, and others all gain from a transition. But 
on balance, Berkshire’s anti-intermediation has proven 
spectacularly enriching113 and KKR’s heavy intermediation is 
prone to excess for the reasons that Judge stresses.114 
The differences between Berkshire and KKR reflect a 
fundamental cultural contrast. In the KKR model, heavy debt and 
associated covenants and due dates not only boost immediate 
returns but also “impose[ ] a stringent discipline on management, 
forcing executives not only to keep costs down, but also to divest 
any business that might fetch a price higher than the value they 
had placed on it.”115 Besides not seeking immediate profit boosts, 
Berkshire’s culture requires no such external discipline: Thrift is 
an inherent value. It induces cost minimization without the need 
for covenants to impose discipline. And the idea of selling a 
business is antithetical to the sense of permanence intended to 
hold Berkshire together in perpetuity. In contrast to the thick 
corporate culture that pervades Berkshire’s subsidiaries, KKR 
companies have no common corporate culture.116 
KKR is not a company in the same sense that Berkshire is, 
nor is it a firm in the sense that Coase used that term. Berkshire 
is a corporate entity owned by its shareholders and comprises 
hundreds of operating businesses and other investments to be 
held indefinitely.117 Berkshire is a successful version of the 
conglomerate business model of the 1970s that firms like KKR 
participated in dismantling, seeing them as bloated and 
unfocused.118 Unlike Berkshire, KKR is not a conglomerate 
organized for perpetual life and has no ability to reallocate capital 
across its portfolio companies—as Berkshire does across its 
 
 112 See Cunningham, Berkshire’s Blemishes at *12–14 (cited in note 109). See also 
Peter Dreier, Human Rights Activists Protest NBA-Linked Sweatshops (Huffington Post, 
May 25, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/42NU-SGJX (describing protests against a 
Berkshire subsidiary employing sweatshops in violation of human rights standards). 
 113 See Cunningham, Berkshire’s Blemishes at *28 (cited in note 109). 
 114 See Anders, Merchants of Debt at 272–73 (cited in note 84) (discussing the failure 
of KKR’s high-leverage model). See also Judge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 585–588 (cited in note 
8) (providing an example of how a prointermediation stance can lead to self-serving 
behaviors by intermediaries). 
 115 Baker and Smith, The New Financial Capitalists at 98 (cited in note 18). 
 116 Id at 100 (“There was certainly no overarching headquarters bureaucracy, and no 
common corporate culture [among KKR’s holdings].”). 
 117 For a description of Berkshire’s business activities, see Berkshire 2014 Report at 
*45 (cited in note 22). For a list of Berkshire’s subsidiaries, see id at *125–27. 
 118 See Baker and Smith, The New Financial Capitalists at 165–66 (cited in note 18) 
(describing the conglomerate business model of the 1970s and 1980s). 
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subsidiaries.119 Rather, KKR consists of a series of distinct limited 
partnerships organized as equity funds with finite lives of rarely 
more than a decade.120 Unlike conglomerates, which seek to retain 
the businesses they acquire, KKR desires to divest them 
profitably and relatively rapidly.121 Berkshire prospers from anti-
intermediation while KKR benefits from prointermediation. 
Judge calls for more information to enable constituents to 
compare the costs of alternative intermediary services.122 It would 
be desirable for sellers of businesses—as well as other 
constituents—to have greater clarity about the fees associated 
with private equity transactions offered by KKR and its peers. 
But if intermediary influence or other forces persist in keeping 
the industry opaque, competitive rivals such as Berkshire do 
exert pressure. These rivals should stimulate questions by 
prospective sellers and entice negotiated reductions by private 
equity firms. More competition of this sort would therefore be a 
desirable counterweight to intermediary pricing power. 
Few companies exhibit Berkshire’s thoroughgoing 
disintermediation, but tailored versions of the model stress its 
virtues at such well-known conscious emulators as Markel 
Corporation123 and Leucadia National Corporation.124 More recent 
variations are emerging in the technology sector, especially 
among companies such as Google in its reorganization as 
Alphabet Inc., designed on the Berkshire model.125 Promising 
derivations appear among shareholder-activist hedge funds, such 
as Pershing Square Capital Management, which can meet the 
goals of some private equity deals—particularly identifying and 
curing business problems—without incurring acquisition costs.126 
Allowed or encouraged to flourish, such competition should put 
downward pressure on private equity fees. They might not 
 
 119 See id at 171 (“Nor could KKR transfer cash from one company to another, so that 
one corporation might support another’s operations or investments. Since each investment 
had separate equity holders, any attempt to intermingle activities in separate companies 
was fraught with difficulties.”). 
 120 See id at 169–70 (charting KKR’s business structure and holding periods for its 
buyouts). 
 121 See Kaplan and Strömberg, 23 J Econ Persp at 128 (cited in note 17). 
 122 See Judge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 636 (cited in note 8). 
 123 See Jason Zweig, Like Buffett, Another Folksy Investor Turns Patience into Profit 
(Wall St J, May 22, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/LH35-KEDB. 
 124 See Ari Charney, Betting on the Next Warren Buffett (Investing Daily, June 12, 
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/MDN5-S583. 
 125 See Tim Mullaney, The True Mastermind behind Google’s Alphabet? Warren 
Buffett (MarketWatch, Aug 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B42S-CMLQ. 
 126 See Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes (Economist, Feb 7, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/X9SB-6B82. 
118  The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue [82: 
   
provoke public disclosure, of course, which Judge rightly notes 
may instead require regulation.127  
II.  QUESTIONS 
Whether considering either companies like Berkshire and 
KKR in the acquisitions market or the examples that Professor 
Judge offers of real estate agents, brokers, funds, and exchanges, 
traditional theories help evaluate financial intermediation and 
related institutional arrangements. But Judge’s impressive 
accomplishment is to unite these disparate examples and 
approaches under the single heading of intermediary influence 
and explain how it arises, how it is exercised, what some of the 
costs are, and how participants might respond. As with most such 
serious intellectual endeavors, the claims are innovative, 
important, and interesting—and they also raise questions, 
including the following. 
A. Scope and Uniqueness of the Puzzle 
First, Judge posits a prodigious puzzle to explain, but the 
puzzle may be more modest than it seems. Intermediaries reduce 
search costs and match end users with providers.128 Judge 
suggests that Internet technology should make searching and 
matching easier so that intermediary fees should fall.129 But she 
sees the opposite in many financial sectors, suggesting that the 
puzzle is more pronounced there.130 Yet technology is not the only 
factor that influences the costs of searching and matching that 
intermediaries can neutralize. Globalization and complexity may 
increase search costs and complicate matching as well. In many 
contemporary industrial settings besides finance, supply chains 
have fragmented and intermediaries have proliferated. Moreover, 
Internet technology may reduce some costs but raise others. For 
example, websites that help buyers compare prices promise 
consumer savings but are funded by referral fees that often skew 
results so that users need other sites to compare the 
 
 127 See Judge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 636 (cited in note 8). 
 128 Id at 574 (noting that intermediaries “bridge information asymmetries, enable 
parties to find one another, and otherwise make it easier for parties to overcome the many 
barriers to transacting”). 
 129 See id at 585. 
 130 See id at 585–86 (noting that it is surprising, in view of advances in technology 
that bridge information asymmetries, that real estate agents are still compensated about 
as much, in real dollars, as they were in the pre-Internet era). 
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comparisons.131 More broadly, problems with intermediary 
influence are not unique to the financial services sector, but 
plague all markets, including those in which producers or 
manufacturers exert influence.132 
B. How to Isolate Influence? 
Second, Judge’s examples of intermediaries suggest a degree 
of influence, but it can be difficult to isolate intermediary 
influence on laws or norms from the influence of other 
participants. For example, multiple intermediary sectors may 
each benefit from a particular outcome, and it is challenging to 
discern which is exercising the relevant influence in shaping 
institutional arrangements. After fixed brokerage fees were 
replaced by competitive rates in 1975 (to give an instance that 
Judge presents prominently), stockbrokers steered customers 
toward mutual funds instead of individual stocks because mutual 
funds were more lucrative—an apparent exercise of stockbroker 
intermediary influence.133 
But a number of concurrent influences had the same effect, 
including advertising by the mutual fund industry,134 urging by 
academic proponents of modern portfolio theory’s directive for 
individuals to diversify,135 and management consultants who 
contended that mutual funds were superior to conglomerates as a 
means of achieving such diversification.136 Above all, while Judge 
posits that the change in fee structure was partly responsible for 
the shift from individual to institutional stock ownership, that 
 
 131 See Costly Comparison (Economist, July 11, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/CEA4-4YLT. 
 132 See generally George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Phishing for Phools: The 
Economics of Manipulation and Deception (Princeton 2015) (exploring and providing 
examples of firms distorting markets by appealing to human psychology). 
 133 Judge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 579–80 (cited in note 8). 
 134 See Matthew P. Fink, The Rise of Mutual Funds: An Insider’s View 146–47 (Oxford 
2008) (noting that in 1979 the SEC allowed mutual funds to run meaningful 
advertisements for the first time since 1933); Lee Gremillion, Mutual Fund Industry 
Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide for Investment Professionals 32 (Wiley 2005) 
(describing several ways that mutual funds transformed from a service to a product in the 
1980s and 1990s, including through advertising).  
 135 For a description of modern portfolio theory’s stance on diversification, see Stewart 
E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent Is Modern Prudent Investment 
Doctrine, 95 Cornell L Rev 851, 858–59 (2010).  
 136 See Gerald F. Davis, Kristina A. Diekmann, and Catherine H. Tinsley, The Decline 
and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an 
Organizational Form, 59 Am Sociological Rev 547, 563–64 (1994) (discussing changes in 
business rhetoric about the effectiveness of the conglomerate form).  
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propensity is a characteristic of a fully developed economy and 
stock market, independent of brokerage-fee structures.137 
Or consider auditing: Accountants may enjoy influence to 
assure that public companies must obtain audits of their financial 
statements. But many other participants push for such 
certifications, too, including investors, academics, and regulators 
who legitimately appreciate the distinct consumer benefits of 
third-party testing. 
As another example, certain intermediary sectors may not be 
united on how to exercise their influence. The retail money-
management industry may be divided between actively managed 
mutual funds and passively managed index funds.138 On some 
matters, their interests converge and their collective influence is 
directed to a joint end; in others, intermediary interests diverge, 
with offsetting results. 
C. Who Really Gains? 
Third, Judge suggests that intermediary influence translates 
into economic gain for intermediaries, but her illustrations are 
instances of broader patterns in the economics of intermediaries 
that often benefit and sometimes cost end users. Take two general 
models of middlemen.139 In one, which is particularly attractive to 
producers, middlemen bundle delivery of a company’s product 
with their own expert services. The middleman may be both a 
salesman and a professional. Consider a dentist conducting a 
checkup who then recommends an implant, or an optometrist 
giving an eye exam along with a prescription for glasses. Patients 
ask physicians for advice based on trust, stressing the 
professional role more than the merchandising one. By training 
and ethics, the doctor’s motivation is to provide the appropriate 
product; by economic incentive, it is to sell the most expensive 
good that is appropriate. In most cases, the patient’s and 
physician’s goals are aligned, although premium pricing often 
results and physicians exert influence on institutional 
arrangements to facilitate such exchanges. Manufacturers of 
dental implants and eyewear benefit, too, enhancing their pricing 
 
 137 See Judge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 606–07 (cited in note 8). 
 138 See generally John C. Bogle, Common Sense on Mutual Funds (Wiley 2d ed 2009) 
(discussing the benefits and disadvantages of investing in mutual funds versus index 
funds). 
 139 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Patrick Hargreaves, and Torkell Eide, Quality 
Investing: Owning the Best Companies for the Long Term *56–58 (forthcoming 2015) (on 
file with author). 
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power while outfitting patients with desired necessities. This 
pattern parallels how mutual funds have benefited greatly from 
stockbroker influence. 
In a second form of intermediation, customers pay 
middlemen for the installation of manufactured products—such 
middlemen include automotive repair shops, electrical 
contractors, or computer-hardware consultants. Invoices separate 
parts from labor and customers focus on labor, searching and 
negotiating for low hourly rates more than examining or haggling 
over the choice or price of goods. The intermediary’s incentives 
are aligned with customer interests to an extent, since 
reputations are on the line to make repairs and installations that 
are safe and reliable. But to the extent that price is a factor, 
incentives are to recommend the most profitable inputs, which 
may impair customer interests while helping manufacturers. In 
the financial services sector, auditors may recommend installing 
SAP risk management software and rating agencies may endorse 
SAS stress testing software for banks. When auditors and rating 
agencies wield influence in such settings, they may generate 
higher fees for themselves but they also confer pricing power on 
producers, and the exact distribution of the gains eludes precise 
measurement. 
D. Industry Structure and Causation 
Finally, Judge implies that the influence of financial 
intermediaries often manifests itself in industry structure, 
particularly in oligopolistic features.140 Yet it is not always clear 
whether influence leads to oligopoly or oligopoly leads to 
influence.141 Oligopolies in many sectors often result from 
products that deliver distinctive consumer benefits. Examples 
among financial intermediaries are auditors and debt rating 
agencies, which provide test-based certifications of specialized 
information that investors cannot verify themselves. An 
 
 140 See, for example, Judge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 621–22 & n 211 (cited in note 8) 
(discussing the outsized influence exerted by financial intermediaries on the formation of 
the Volcker Rule, which could have “direct implications for institutional arrangements 
that [would] affect intermediary profitability and institutional design”). 
 141 See id at 618 (“Two factors—the number of participants in an industry and 
whether industry participants are collectively organized for other purposes—affect the 
probability that intermediaries will succeed in promoting favorable institutional 
arrangements.”). 
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oligopolistic structure can arise from requirements of 
professionalization and scale rather than industry influence.142 
As a broader category, consider producers of “modest 
essentials”—inputs that cost little in context but are vital. Cheap 
machine tools used in aerospace manufacturing, enzymes added 
to food products such as yogurt, and industrial gases employed in 
processes such as steelmaking all represent a tiny fraction of the 
user’s production costs, but each is essential.143 Providers 
therefore command pricing power, with the result that the 
industry is dominated by large, reputable firms with oligopolistic 
industry structures.144 Though not exactly middlemen, these 
providers share something in common with financial 
intermediaries: when raising capital, both auditing and rating 
fees are small in context but are nevertheless an unavoidable 
prerequisite. 
Oligopolistic intermediaries do tend to produce competition 
among rivals that is more benign than vigorous. Firms that 
possess oligopoly power, especially those that provide relatively 
uniform products, know that they will be competing for decades 
to come.145 The result is competitive behavior that promotes 
industry stability more than it leads to price wars among rivals. 
This is true not only of auditing and rating firms but also of 
suppliers of industrial gases and makers of other modest 
essentials.146 So the challenging question is whether intermediary 
influence causes institutional arrangements that create pricing 
power and high fees, or whether institutional arrangements cause 
such intermediary influence. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Judge paints a rich picture, using an appealing 
combination of broad strokes and pointillism to shed new light on 
an old setting. She offers insightful accounts of specific features 
of the financial services industry, such as why real estate agents 
still command premium prices, why stockbrokers were able to 
 
 142 See Edgar K. Browning and Mark A. Zupan, Microeconomics: Theory and 
Applications 310–11, 359 (Wiley 7th ed 2002). 
 143 Cunningham, Hargreaves, and Eide, Quality Investing at *61 (cited in note 139).  
 144 See id. 
 145 See id at *63. See also Browning and Zupan, Microeconomics at 358 (cited in note 
142) (describing the “strong mutual interdependence” of firms in an oligopolistic market, 
meaning that “a firm’s actions . . . have a noticeable effect on its rivals, and so they are 
likely to react in some way”) (emphasis omitted). 
 146 See Cunningham, Hargreaves, and Eide, Quality Investing at *60–63 (cited in note 
139). 
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maintain anticompetitive fixed commissions for so long, and why 
mutual funds proliferate while charging fees that exceed the 
funds’ value to investors. She steps back to explain general 
features of the financial landscape that give intermediaries 
potentially excessive pricing power, and catalogues the 
considerable costs. And she notes potential policy responses, 
including stimulating private market actors to respond. 
In this Essay, I have extended Judge’s insights with an 
illustration from the acquisitions market, depicting one firm 
(KKR) that epitomizes intermediary influence, in contrast to a 
rival (Berkshire)—the anti-intermediary par excellence. The 
juxtaposition affirms the portrait of intermediary influence that 
Judge paints as well as the potential for correction through lower-
priced competition and fee disclosure she posits. 
Judge stresses that her accounts of intermediary influence 
are partial explanations and that there are degrees of both their 
influence and their effects. This modesty explains the existence of 
some of the unanswered questions I have highlighted. The 
importance of Judge’s work is in showing why pursuing answers 
to such questions is warranted—to gauge the puzzle’s size, isolate 
the specific influence, measure the relative gains, and examine 
which comes first: intermediary influence that commands high 
fees or institutional arrangements that condone them. 
